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IN THE 291st CRIMINAL DISTRICT
COURT
DALLAS COUNTY,
TEXAS
THE
STATE OF TEXAS
v.
DAMONS LOUISE
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CRIMINAL
NUMBER: F0283772
F0202033
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DEFENDANT LEWIS’S
MOTION AND INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM
FOR PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF BRADY MATERIAL
AND/OR INFORMATION WHICH MAY LEAD TO
EVIDENCE
Defendant DAMONS LOUISE (“Defendant ”)
hereby moves this Court, pursuant to Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and
its progeny, to order the government to
inquire about and make the following disclosures.
A. SPECIFIC BRADY REQUESTS
The Defendant respectfully requests that
the Court order the government to inquire
about and to disclose all materials, information,
photographs, videos, recordings, records,
notes, reports, electronic mail, communication
and statements (herein referred to as “information”)
known to the Government/State or which
may become known, or which through due
diligence may be learned from the investigating
officers or the witnesses or persons having
knowledge of this case, which is exculpatory
in nature or favorable to Defendant or
may lead to exculpatory or favorable material
regarding either guilt or punishment. This
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Information tending to indicate
that Defendant is not guilty of the offenses
alleged in the Indictments.
2. Information showing Defendant’s
reputation for honesty, integrity,
and/or trustworthiness.
3. Information showing the reputation
for honesty, integrity, and/or trustworthiness,
and/or any criminal record of any witness
called by the State, including any complaining
witness.
4. Names of any individuals who made
an arguably favorable statement
about the Defendant, or who indicated to
law enforcement that Defendant is not guilty
of the crimes alleged in the
Indictments, or that the Defendant might
not have had the intent to deprive the
owner of property or funds or that any
appropriation of property or funds was
done with the owner’s effective consent
or that the value of the property or funds
alleged to have been stolen or illegally
converted is less then the amounts alleged
in the Indictments.
5. Information which arguably could
be helpful or useful to the defense
in detracting from the probative force
of the government’s
evidence, including impeachment evidence,
or which arguably could lead to such
information, including information that
the Defendant might not have had the
intent to deprive the owner of property
or funds or that any appropriation of
property or funds was done with the owner’s
effective consent or that the
value of the property or funds
alleged to have been stolen or
illegally converted is less then
the amounts alleged in the Indictments.
This request includes, but is
not limited to, the following
information, regarding any potential
witness, informant or any government
agent who has been involved in
the investigation of this case:
(a) requests or statements by government
agents or employees to any
individual or corporation regarding the
payment of defendants’ legal fees
or expenses;
(b) prior convictions, arrests,
misconduct, wrongs or bad acts;
(c)
prior
or subsequent inconsistent statements;
(d) instructions not to discuss the case
with defense counsel;
(e) the mental, emotional,
and physical history of Defendant, or
any witness,
(f) the use of any lie detector
or polygraph tests on any witness and
the results;
(g) the use of narcotics or other
controlled substances or alcohol;
(h) defect
or deficiency of character for truthfulness,
including but not limited to the complainant
and officers involved in the investigation/arrest
of Defendant;
(i)
partiality, prejudice,
bias, motive, interest or corruption;
(j) any
defect or deficiency of capacity
in any prospective witness to observe,
remember or recount events;
(k) the existence
and identification of each occasion on
which each witness who was or is an informer,
accomplice, or expert, has testified
before any court, grand jury, or other
tribunal or body;
(l) any benefit to individuals
whatsoever in exchange for their cooperation,
assistance or testimony, and any incentives
paid, promised or discussed with the witness
and the witness’s prior history
of cooperation with law enforcement;
(m) a
threat to prosecute if cooperation
was not forthcoming;
(n)a promise or suggestion
of leniency, compensation, assurance
not to prosecute, or representations with
respect to any uncharged misconduct;
(o) the
immigration status of any potential government
witness or informant who is not a United
States citizen;
(p) any probation, parole,
deferred adjudication, or deferred government
or custodial status;
(q) any pending or
potential criminal, civil or administrative
investigations, legal disputes or transactions
over which the government has real, apparent
or perceived influence which could be
brought against the witness or friends
or relatives of the witness;
B. ARGUMENT
1. Disclosure of Materials.
The settled principles in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976),
and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995), instruct that the government
may not suppress evidence favorable to
a defendant either as direct or impeaching
evidence. All documents and information
which are exculpatory must be provided
to the defense.
Courts have noted that the test is not
whether the government attorneys believe
the material to be favorable to the defense.
Rather, it is whether the material “could
fairly be construed as favorable to the
defendant and material to the issue of
guilt or punishment. . . .” United
States v. Partin, 320 F.
Supp. 285 ( E.D. La. 1970). Doubts as to
whether certain items of evidence or types
of information could be construed in the
defense’s favor should be resolved
in favor of their production to the defense. United
States v. Perkins, 383 F.
Supp. 922, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Since
material containing leads to possible exculpatory
evidence must also be produced under Brady,
the evidence itself need not be admissible
at trial.
All information relating to the credibility
of a witness clearly must be provided to
the Defendant. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Under
Rule 608(b) of the Fed. R. Evid., the court
has discretion to permit a defendant to
cross-examine a witness as to specific
instances of misconduct -- so called bad
acts. The purpose of such testimony is
specifically to attack the witness’ character;
therefore, the government should be ordered
to disclose to the defense any behavior
of government witnesses that might arguably
constitute such bad acts.
Similarly, the government has an obligation
to disclose any and all consideration which
is held out to a witness, or which the
witness objectively hopes for or anticipates,
because such consideration directly gives
rise to an inference of interest. United
States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d
245 (5 th Cir. 1977). A defendant is also
entitled to be advised of any matter which
might cause a witness to color his testimony
in favor of the government out of fear
or interest in self-preservation. Thus,
the government must disclose both the stick
and the carrot. United States v.
Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4 th Cir. 1976).
If the government possesses any information
which might reveal that anyone became a
witness in this case because of any pressure
applied to him by any other federal law
enforcement or regulatory body, the government
should be required to disclose this information.
The evidence of any such representations,
which have been made by the government
or which the government will make at any
future time, is discoverable pursuant to
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution;
and the withholding of any such evidence
constitutes a denial to a defendant herein
of his constitutionally protected rights
to due process and fundamental fairness
in the criminal proceedings brought against
him. Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady, 373
U.S. at 85. Such evidence is not only exculpatory
in the sense that it is legitimate grounds
for impeachment of any witnesses the government
may call to testify against the defendant, Williams
v. Dutton 400 F.2d 797 (5 th Cir.
1968), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 1105 (1969), but also is discoverable
by a defendant in order to show such witnesses’ bias
or prejudice in testifying at trial. Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
2. Prompt Disclosure.
Moreover, the production of the requested
material should be required promptly and
not postponed for the following reasons:
If it is to be any use to him at all,
common sense dictates that evidence in
the Government’s possession favorable
to the defendant should be made available
to him far enough in advance of trial to
allow him sufficient time for its evaluation,
preparation, and presentation at trial.
Otherwise, the trial might well have to
be interrupted for an inordinate length
of time until the defendant has had an
opportunity to explore all the ramifications
of the Government’s disclosure, track
down distant witnesses, examine documents
or the like. Such probable delay could
sensibly be avoided by pre-trial disclosure
in those cases where disclosure is called
for.
United States v. Partin ,
320 F. Supp. 275 ( E.D. La. 1970).
3. Request for Thorough Search.
The prosecutor in this case must search
not only for his own files for Brady material,
but also the files of other employees of
the District Attorney’s Office, including
any victim/witness contact personnel, whether
paid or volunteers , and any other municipal,
county, state or federal agencies involved
in this matter, including the U.S. and
Texas Securities and Exchange Commission,
Texas Attorney General’s Office,
Dallas Police Department, the Dallas County
Sheriff’s Office, and the United
States Department of Justice. See,
e.g., Kyles v. Whitney, 514 U.S. 419,
437, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1567 (1995) (“[T]he
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the
other acting on the government’s
behalf in the case, including the police.”); United
States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9
th Cir. 1995) (holding that exculpatory
material in the possession of the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
files was within the constructive knowledge
and possession of the prosecutors because
the FDA was involved in the investigation
and the FDA was the agency charged with
administering the statute at issue); United
States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441,
1450 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that, in
their search for Brady material,
prosecutors must “inform themselves
about everything that is known in all of
the archives and all of the data banks
of all of the agencies collecting information
which could assist in the construction
of alternative scenarios to that which
they intend to prove at trial”).
C. PRAYER
For these reasons, Defendant Loses requests
that the government be required to produce
all items enumerated in this Motion.
Dated: May 2, 2006 Respectfully submitted,
David Finn, P.C.
By: |
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David
Finn
MILNER & FINN
2828 North Harwood,
Suite 1950
Dallas, Texas 75201
Texas Bar No. 07026900
(214) 651.1121
(telephone)
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Counsel
for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that
a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document has been served, via
hand-delivery, upon all counsel of record,
as identified below, on May 2, 2006:
Mr. Jeff
Bray
Assistant District Attorney Workroom
Dallas
County District Attorney’s
Office
Dallas, Texas
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David Finn
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF BRADY MATERIAL
AND/OR INFORMATION WHICH MAY LEAD TO EVIDENCE
CAME ON for consideration Defendant Loses’s
Motion for Production and Inspection of Brady Material
and/or Information Which May Lead to Evidence
and, upon consideration, the Court is of
the opinion that said Motion should be
granted.
SO ORDERED this ________ day of _________________,
2003.
__________________________________________
JUDGE SUSAN HAWK
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